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1 Introduction
Ever since the seminal paper of Shapley and Shubik (1954), the a priori assessment of the power
possessed by each agent participating in a decision making body has been an important topic in
game theory. Simple coalitional games can be used to describe these situations by attaching 1 to
any coalition that is strong enough to pass a proposal and 0 to the rest. If power is understood
as the ability of an agent to change the outcome of a ballot, it is sensible to use the marginal
contributions to develop power indices. Thus, the value proposed by Shapley (1953) to distribute
the surplus generated from the cooperation of the agents in economic environments has been
shown to be valuable also for evaluating the power in a legislature or committee.
In this paper, we aim at studying the distribution of power in the presence of coalitional
externalities. Consider, for instance, a legislature that uses the plurality rule to elect the prime
minister. There are cases where minority governments emerge just because the remaining parties
do not agree on an alternative candidate. In such a situation, whether a coalition is winning
or not may depend on the behavior of the rest of the parties. This shows that games in
partition function form (Thrall and Lucas, 1963) are the appropiate framework in which to
study situations like these. Some years ago, Bolger (1986) employed games in partition function
form to study multi-candidate elections and proposed several power indices. One of the main
novelties of our approach is to consider a subclass of games in partition function form that are
monotonic. This class of games generalizes the simple games in characteristic function form
as introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The aforementioned monotonicity
property has been recently proposed in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2015) and makes special sense in
situations with negative externalities, such as the ones outlined above.
The problem of extending the Shapley value to games in partition function form was first
tackled by Myerson (1977). More recently, the topic has attracted some attention and alternative
generalizations of the Shapley value have been proposed (Albizuri et al., 2005; Macho-Stadler
et al., 2007; de Clippel and Serrano, 2008; Dutta et al., 2010). The existence of so many different
proposals can be explained by the difficult task of generalizing marginal contributions to games
in partition function form. Indeed, if we want to measure the change in the utility of a coalition
when one of its members leaves it, then we should know which coalition will the defecting agent
join, if any. Albizuri et al. (2005) assume that the agent can join any coalition and that any
such coalition configuration is equally likely. Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) generalize the previous
approach by considering a probability distribution over the different events that could take
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place. However, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) argue that the intrinsic marginal contribution is
originated by an agent that leaves a coalition to become a singleton. In a subsequent step, the
agent could join any coalition, but the effect of this move should not be considered a marginal
contribution. Finally, Dutta et al. (2010) follow the potential approach and study a family of
values that contains the previous proposals.
In this paper, we study the restriction of the value introduced by de Clippel and Serrano
(2008) to simple games in partition function form as devised by Alonso-Meijide et al. (2015). The
monotonicity property of the class of simple games considered allows us to speak about minimal
winning embedded coalitions. This kind of coalition enables us to define null and symmetric
players while avoiding the concept of marginal contribution. We show that this power index
is the only one which is efficient, symmetric, and has both the null player property and the
transfer property. These four properties are natural adaptations of the homonymous properties
in frameworks without externalities. The first three are properties that any sensible power index
should have (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) and the last is the transfer property proposed by
Dubey (1975). The rest of this note is organized into two sections. The preliminaries state some
previous results and Section 3 presents our characterization result.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a finite set (|N | > 1) of players that we keep fixed henceforth. A characteristic
function is a mapping v : 2N = {S : S ⊆ N} → R, satisfying v(∅) = 0. The set of characteristic
functions is denoted by CG. A value is a mapping f that assigns a unique vector f(v) ∈ RN to
every v ∈ CG. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), Sh, defined for every v ∈ CG and i ∈ N by1
Shi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
[v (S ∪ i)− v (S)] .
The set of partitions of N is denoted by P(N).2 An embedded coalition is a pair (S, P ) where
P ∈ P(N) and S ∈ P . We will sometimes refer to S as the active coalition in P and we will say
that a player i ∈ N belongs to an embedded coalition (S, P ) when i ∈ S. The set of embedded
coalitions is denoted by EC, i.e., EC = {(S, P ) : P ∈ P(N) and S ∈ P}. Given P ∈ P(N) and a
nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , we let P−S ∈ P(N \ S) denote the partition P = {T \ S : T ∈ P}.
1We abuse notation slightly and write T ∪ i and T \ i instead of T ∪ {i} and T \ {i}, respectively, for T ⊆ N
and i ∈ N . We use lowercase letters to denote the cardinality of a finite set.
2For convenience, we assume that the empty set is an element of every partition even though we may omit
writing it, i.e., for every P ∈ P(N), ∅ ∈ P .
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A partition function is a mapping v : EC → R such that v(∅, P ) = 0 for every P ∈ P(N).
The set of partition functions is denoted by G. Is is easy to see that G is a vector space over
R. Indeed, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) develop a basis of the vector space that we present
below. Given (S, P ) ∈ EC, with S 6= ∅, let e(S,P ) ∈ G be defined for every (T,Q) ∈ EC by
e(S,P )(T,Q) =
1 if S ⊆ T and ∀T
′ ∈ Q \ T, ∃S′ ∈ P such that T ′ ⊆ S′, 3
0 otherwise.
Then, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) show that
{
e(S,P ) : (S, P ) ∈ EC and S 6= ∅
}
constitutes a
basis of G.
In this paper, we focus on the so-called simple games in partition function form as introduced
in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2015). This subclass of partition functions is a natural generalization
of the class of simple games in characteristic function form. In order to define monotonicity in
the class G, we consider the following notion of inclusion between embedded coalitions.
Definition 2.1. Let (S, P ), (T,Q) ∈ EC. We say that (S, P ) is contained in (T,Q) and write
(S, P ) v (T,Q) when S ⊆ T and ∀T ′ ∈ Q \ T , ∃S′ ∈ P such that T ′ ⊆ S′.
Note that whenever S 6= ∅, (S, P ) v (T,Q) if and only if e(S,P )(T,Q) = 1. According to the
above definition, an embedded coalition (S, P ) is a subset of another embedded coalition (T,Q)
if the active coalition in P is contained in the active coalitions in Q (i.e., S ⊆ T ) and moreover,
the partition P−T is coarser than Q\T . Notice that both P−T and Q\T are partitions of N \T .
We are now in the position to introduce the class of games under study.
Definition 2.2. A partition function v ∈ G is said to be a simple game (with externalities) if
it satisfies the three conditions below:
i) For every (S, P ) ∈ EC, v(S, P ) ∈ {0, 1}.
ii) v(N, {∅, N}) = 1.
iii) If (S, P ), (T,Q) ∈ EC is such that (S, P ) v (T,Q), then v(S, P ) ≤ v(T,Q).
An embedded coalition, (S, P ) ∈ EC, is said to be winning if v(S, P ) = 1 and losing otherwise.
The set of simple games is denoted by SG.
The monotonicity property defined in point iii) above allows us to properly speak about
minimal winning embedded coalitions. Let v ∈ SG. A winning embedded coalition, (S, P ) ∈
3As before, we may omit the braces and write Q \ T instead of Q \ {T} for every T ∈ Q ∈ P(N).
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EC, is said to be minimal if every proper subset of it is a losing embedded coalition, i.e., if
(T,Q) @ (S, P ) implies that v(T,Q) = 0.4 The set of all minimal winning embedded coalitions
of a simple game is denoted by M(v) and the subset of minimal winning embedded coalitions
that contain a given player i ∈ N is denoted by Mi(v), i.e., Mi(v) = {(S, P ) ∈M(v) : i ∈ S}.
A player i ∈ N is said to be a null player in v ∈ SG if i does not belong to any minimal
winning embedded coalition, i.e., Mi(v) = ∅.
Two players i and j are said to be symmetric in v if exchanging the two players in an
embedded coalition in which either player participates does not change its worth. Formally, let
pi : N → N be defined by pi(i) = j, pi(j) = i, and for every l ∈ N \ {i, j}, pi(l) = l. Then, i and j
are symmetric in v if for every (S, P ) ∈M(v) such that i ∈ S and j /∈ S, (pi(S), pi(P )) ∈M(v),
where pi(S) = {pi(i) : i ∈ S} and pi(P ) = {pi(S) : S ∈ P}.
3 The Shapley–Shubik index in the presence of external-
ities
A power index is a mapping, f, that assigns a vector f(v) ∈ RN to every simple game v ∈ SG,
where each coordinate fi(v) describes the power of player i ∈ N . Next, we present four properties
that a power index may satisfy. All of them are based on well known properties in the framework
of games in characteristic function form, adapted to our setting.
eff A power index f is efficient if
∑
i∈N fi(v) = 1 for every v ∈ SG.
npp A power index f has the null player property if fi(v) = 0 for every v ∈ SG and every null
player i ∈ N in v.
sym A power index f is symmetric property if fi(v) = fj(v) for every (N, v) ∈ SG and every
pair i, j ∈ N of symmetric players in v.
tra A power index f has the transfer property if f(v) + f(w) = f(v ∨ w) + f(v ∧ w) for every
pair of simple games v, w ∈ SG.
First of all, we show that these four properties single out a unique power index.
Theorem 3.1. There is at most one power index satisfying eff, npp, sym, and tra.
4A proper subset, (T,Q) @ (S, P ), is a subset (T,Q) v (S, P ) satisfying (T,Q) 6= (S, P ).
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Proof. Let f be a power index satisfying the four properties. We show, by induction on the
number of minimal winning coalitions, that f is unique.
First, let v ∈ SG be such that |M(v)| = 1. ThenM(v) = {(S, P )} for some (S, P ) ∈ EC and
v = e(S,P ). It is immediate to check that every i /∈ S is a null player in e(S,P ). Then, by npp,
fi
(
e(S,P )
)
= 0. Similarly, every two players in S are symmetric in e(S,P ). Then, by sym, they
get the same payoff and by eff we conclude that fi
(
e(S,P )
)
= 1|S| for every i ∈ S.
Second, suppose that f is uniquely determined for every v ∈ SG with |M(v)| < r. Let v ∈ SG
with M(v) = {(S1, P 1) , . . . , (Sr, P r)}. Next, since v is monotonic, for every (T,Q) ∈ EC,
v(T,Q) = max
(S,P )∈M(v)
e(S,P )(T,Q) = max
{
w(T,Q), e(Sr,P r)(T,Q)
}
,
where w(T,Q) = max
k∈{1,...,r−1}
e(Sk,Pk)(T,Q). Since v = w ∨ e(Sr,P r), by tra,
f(w) + f
(
e(Sr,P r)
)
= f(v) + f
(
w ∧ e(Sr,P r)
)
.
Note that the two payoffs on the left-hand side of the equation above are uniquely determined
by the induction hypothesis. Then it only remains to prove that the vector f
(
w ∧ e(Sr,P r)
)
is
uniquely determined.
Third, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, we define the coalition Tk = Sk ∩ Sr and the par-
tition Qk =
{
U ∩ V : U ∈ P k and V ∈ P r}. Observe that (Tk, Qk) ∈ EC. We claim that
M (w ∧ e(Sr,P r)) = {(Tk, Qk) : k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}}. Indeed, let (T,Q) ∈ EC. Then
w ∧ e(Sr,P r)(T,Q) = 1⇔
w(T,Q) = 1 ande(Sr,Pr)(T,Q) = 1 ⇔
∃k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} : (Sk, Pk) v (T,Q) and(Sr, Pr) v (T,Q)
⇔ ∃k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} :
Sk ∩ Sr ⊆ T andQ \ T is finer than P k \ Sk and P r \ Sr
Notice that, by definition of Qk, any partition which is finer than both P k \ Sk and P r \ Sr is
necessarily finer than Qk \ Tk. Thus, the above statement is equivalent to
∃k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} :
Tk ⊆ T andQ \ T is finer than Qk \ Tk ⇔ ∃k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} : (Tk, Qk) v (T,Q).
Since all the above statements are if and only if implications, we have shown the claim.
Fourth, and last, since
∣∣M (w ∧ e(Sr,P r))∣∣ < r, by the induction hypothesis f (w ∧ e(Sr,P r))
is unique and the proof is concluded. 
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Finally, we show that there is indeed one power index with the four properties. As did Shapley
and Shubik (1954), we consider the restriction of the externality-free value of (de Clippel and
Serrano, 2008) to our class of simple games.
Definition 3.1. The externality-free Shapley–Shubik index, SS, is the power index defined by
SS(v) = Sh(v∗), where v ∈ SG and v∗ ∈ CG is then defined by putting v∗(S) = v (S,{S, {j}j∈N\S})
for each S ⊆ N . 5
Theorem 3.2. SS satisfies eff, npp, sym, and tra.
Proof. eff follows from the fact that Sh is efficient.
To show npp, let i ∈ N be a null player in v ∈ SG. We will see that v∗(S∪i) = v∗(S) for every
S ⊆ N\i. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is a coalition S ⊆ N\i such that v∗(S∪i) 6= v∗(S).
Then, by definition of v∗, v
(
S ∪ i,{S ∪ i, {j}j∈N\(S∪i)}) 6= v (S,{S, {j}j∈N\S}). Taking into
account that
(
S,
{
S, {j}j∈N\S
}) v (S ∪ i,{S ∪ i, {j}j∈N\(S∪i)}) and the definition of SG, we
necessarily have that v
(
S ∪ i,{S ∪ i, {j}j∈N\(S∪i)}) = 1 and v (S,{S, {j}j∈N\S}) = 0. Since
i is a null player in v,
(
S ∪ i,{S ∪ i, {j}j∈N\(S∪i)}) cannot be a minimal winning embedded
coalition in (N, v). Let (T,Q) ∈ M(v) be such that (T,Q) v (S ∪ i,{S ∪ i, {j}j∈N\(S∪i)}).
Again, since i is a null player in v, i /∈ T or, equivalently, T ⊆ S. Then
(T,Q) v (S,{S, {j}j∈N\S}) ,
which contradicts the assumption that v
(
S,
{
S, {j}j∈N\S
})
= 0. That is, we have shown that i
is a null player in the classical sense in the characteristic function v∗. Finally, since Sh satisfies
the null player property (Shapley, 1953), SSi(N, v) = 0.
To show sym, let i, j ∈ N be two symmetric players in v ∈ SG and let S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Suppose that
(
S ∪ i,{S ∪ i, {l}l∈N\(S∪i)}) is a winning embedded coalition. We show that(
S ∪ j,{S ∪ j, {l}l∈N\(S∪j)}) is also winning embedded coalition. Indeed, suppose that there is
a (T,Q) ∈ M(v) such that (T,Q) v (S ∪ i,{S ∪ i, {l}l∈N\(S∪i)}). On the one hand, if i /∈ T ,
then (T,Q) ⊆ (S ∪ j,{S ∪ j, {l}l∈N\(S∪j)}) and we are done. On the other hand, suppose
that i ∈ T . Let pi : N → N be defined by pi(i) = j, pi(j) = i, and for every l ∈ N \ {i, j},
pi(l) = l. Note that since i and j are symmetric players, (pi(T ), pi(Q)) ∈ M(v). Moreover,
(pi(T ), pi(Q)) v (S ∪ j,{S ∪ j, {l}l∈N\(S∪j)}) because pi(T ) = (T \ i) ∪ j ⊆ S ∪ j. All in all,
we have shown that i and j are symmetric players (in the classical sense) in the characteristic
5Observe that for our class of simple games, v∗ associates to every coalition its optimistic expected worth.
I.e., if v ∈ SG, then for every S ⊆ N , v∗(S) = max
(S,P )∈EC
{v(S, P )}.
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function v∗. Finally, since Sh is symmetric (Shapley, 1953), the payoffs of i and j in v according
to SS coincide.
To show tra, let v, w ∈ SG. Then
SS(v) + SS(w) = Sh(v∗) + Sh(w∗) = Sh(v∗ ∨ w∗) + Sh(v∗ ∧ w∗) = Sh((v ∨ w)∗) + Sh((v ∧ w)∗)
= SS(v ∨ w) + SS(v ∧ w),
where the first and last equalities hold by definition of SS, the second is due to the fact that Sh
satisfies the classic transfer property (Dubey, 1975), and the third follows from v∗∨w∗ = (v∨w)∗
and v∗ ∧ w∗ = (v ∧ w)∗. Indeed, if S ⊆ N , then
(v∗ ∨ w∗)(S) = max{v∗(S), w∗(S)} = max{v (S, {S, {j}j∈N\S}) , w (S, {S, {j}j∈N\S})}
= (v ∨ w) (S, {S, {j}j∈N\S}) = (v ∨ w)∗(S).
Exchanging the maximum with the minimum in the equation above shows that v∗∧w∗ = (v∧w)∗,
which concludes the proof. 
To conclude, we present the characterization result and show the logical independence of the
four properties.
Theorem 3.3. The externality-free Shapley–Shubik index is the only power index satisfying
eff, npp, sym, and tra. Moreover, the four properties are independent.
Proof. The characterization is a direct consequence of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. To show the
independence, consider the following power indices.
Let f1 be the power index defined by f1i (v) = 0 for v ∈ SG and i ∈ N . Then f1 satisfies npp,
sym, and tra, but not eff.
Let f2 be the power index defined by f2i (v) =
1
n for v ∈ SG and i ∈ N . Then f2 satisfies eff,
sym, and tra, but not npp.
Let f3 be the power index defined as follows: if v ∈ SG is such that v(S, P ) = 0 for every
(S, P ) ∈ EC with S 6= N , then f3(v) = (1, 0 . . . , 0). For any other v ∈ SG, put f3(v) = SS(v).
Then f3 satisfies eff, npp, and tra, but not sym.
The DP-externality power index defined in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2015) satisfies eff, npp,
and sym, but not tra. 
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